

2348

(b) (1)
(b) (3)
(S)



*Directorate of
Intelligence*

~~Top Secret~~ 411

Mozambique: RENAMO at a Crossroads

A Research Paper

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2003

~~Top Secret~~

MARCH 1991

2350




*Directorate of
Intelligence*

~~Top Secret~~

Mozambique: RENAMO at a Crossroads

A Research Paper



Reverse Blank

REFERENCE BLANK)

~~Top Secret~~

Top Secret**Mozambique: RENAMO
at a Crossroads****Summary**

*Information available
as of 1 December 1990
was used in this report.*

The Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), which has waged a 14-year war against the ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), has come under strong pressure from many quarters over the past 18 months to negotiate a peace accord with Maputo. Intensive diplomatic efforts since 1989 by the United States, Catholic Church officials, and West European and African governments to end the war, as well as President Chissano's aggressive political and economic reform program and waning external assistance to the rebels, have helped push RENAMO to the negotiating table. While progress has been halting, both FRELIMO and RENAMO have conceded that negotiations are the only way to resolve the conflict. If negotiations prove successful, Mozambicans could go to the polls later this year to ultimately decide the winner of the longstanding struggle between FRELIMO and RENAMO.

A peaceful resolution to the war between RENAMO and FRELIMO would not only have a positive impact on regional stability and economic growth, but would also place new financial demands on the United States. We believe that once peace is achieved, both RENAMO and Maputo will expect Washington to help fund much of Mozambique's multibillion-dollar recovery effort. The rehabilitation of Mozambique's important southern African transportation routes undoubtedly would facilitate economic development in the region. Regardless of the degree of possible future US aid to Mozambique, we judge that Washington's extensive diplomatic efforts to end the war will help the United States improve relations with Mozambique as well as its credentials in the entire region.

RENAMO has entered negotiations in a weak political position. The insurgency's relatively narrow ethnic base among Shona ethnic groups, its birth as an agent of the white minority Rhodesian Government, and history of abuse of civilians have limited its popular appeal beyond some segments of the Mozambican peasantry; we estimate RENAMO now numbers between 15,000 and 20,000 people. Despite RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama's efforts to curb these human rights abuses, the insurgents still regularly brutalize and kill civilians. Dhlakama has failed to articulate a specific vision for a postwar government or what role he sees for himself and RENAMO in such a government. Instead he has espoused only vague political goals that include democratic rule and a Western-style economy. In addition, most

Top Secret

~~Top Secret~~

RENAMO insurgents appear less motivated by their political aims than by specific personal grievances against the government and by the opportunity to enrich themselves. Meanwhile, the government has begun to dismantle many of its unpopular socialist policies that RENAMO exploited to expand its following; these moves probably have further undermined the rebels' political appeal, especially among those opposed to FRELIMO's past socialist policies. []

RENAMO's political organization remains plagued by widespread factionalism, corruption, and often incompetent leaders. The external political wing—a small group of RENAMO exiles who engage in fundraising and lobbying—is prone to squabbling and is distrusted by most rebel military commanders. The internal political wing is small and underdeveloped and lacks any substantial administrative network in areas under RENAMO's military control. In our view, Dhlakama's numerous personnel changes during 1989, which were intended to strengthen RENAMO politically, have led to little improvement. []

While RENAMO does not appear capable of achieving a military victory, it has a strong, largely self-sustaining fighting force that has exploited the weaknesses of the Mozambican Army and substantially destroyed the country's infrastructure. Dhlakama serves as RENAMO's unchallenged military leader and is highly respected by his troops. He oversees a staff of senior officers that attempts to coordinate nationwide insurgent activity. Most insurgents are lightly armed and routinely operate in small bands, although they sometimes form groups of several hundred when mounting major attacks. [] They primarily engage in hit-and-run raids on poorly defended economic facilities or military installations, as well as in occasional attacks on larger cities. While the rebels take care to avoid engaging the well-trained and effective Zimbabwean forces, they do conduct cross-border raids into neighboring Zimbabwe and Zambia in retaliation for Harare's and Lusaka's military support to the Maputo government. []

Although RENAMO captures much of its equipment and supplies from the Mozambican military and civilians, ammunition and supply shortages since late 1989 suggest that RENAMO's main sources of external assistance have been severely curtailed. The South African Government—RENAMO's traditional supplier of arms and logistic assistance—almost certainly has significantly reduced its material aid to the insurgents because of Pretoria's gradual political rapprochement with Maputo and its new regional policy of fostering closer ties to its neighbors. Nonetheless, Pretoria is maintaining close contact with RENAMO in order to retain

~~Top Secret~~

2353

~~Top Secret~~

influence with the insurgents and thus have some say over the terms of a possible peace settlement. RENAMO continues to receive limited financial and material assistance from private sympathizers in South Africa, Portugal, Brazil, Germany, and the United States, as well as some covert aid from the governments of Malawi and Kenya, [redacted]

[redacted]

Reverse Blank

v

~~Top Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~**Contents**

	<i>Page</i>
Summary	iii
Scope Note	ix
Introduction	1
Vague Political Goals and Limited Popular Support	1
Ethnic Base of Support	2
Mobilizing Popular Backing	5
Troubled Political Leadership	5
The External Wing	5
The Internal Wing	8
Effective Military Force	8
Centralized Chain of Command	10
Dhlakama's Key Role	10
Organization	10
Morale and Discipline Problems	10
Capabilities	11
Communications and Weaponry	11
Intelligence Collection	12
Tactics	12
Cross-Border Raids	13
Urban Sabotage	13
Waning External Assistance	13
Changing South African Ties	13
Regional and Private Support	15
Malawian Assistance	15
Kenyan Aid	15
Rumored Arab Assistance	16
Private Support	16
Outlook	16
Implications for the Region and the United States	17

~~Top Secret~~


~~Top Secret~~**Scope Note**

After 14 years of fighting, both the Mozambican Government and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) have begun to engage in direct talks aimed at a negotiated settlement. This paper closely examines the RENAMO organization as it faces new and unprecedented challenges associated with the peace process. It analyzes RENAMO's efforts to improve its weak political organization and ensure the continued effectiveness of its military structure. It also reviews RENAMO's external sources of assistance. Finally, it examines the challenges to RENAMO posed by formal negotiations and the implications for the United States of a political settlement.

~~Top Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~

Figure 1
Mozambique and Other Frontline States



~~Top Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~

Mozambique: RENAMO at a Crossroads

Introduction

Since 1977, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) has been engaged in a bitter armed struggle against the ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), itself a former insurgent group. RENAMO, originally formed by the white Rhodesian government to collect intelligence on Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwean guerrilla forces operating from bases in Mozambique, has grown to a 15,000- to 20,000-man insurgency operating in all 10 Mozambique provinces. The largely ineffective 60,000-man Mozambican military has failed to prevent RENAMO from frequently attacking government installations, civilian population centers, and economic facilities. With the support of several thousand Zimbabwean troops since late 1982, however, government forces have secured provincial capitals, as well as larger towns and transportation corridors. The longstanding military stalemate has cost hundreds of thousands of lives, crippled Mozambique's economy, and caused widespread hunger, population displacements, and human rights abuses.

Vague Political Goals and Limited Popular Support

RENAMO's initial popular support, in our view, stemmed from its status as the only alternative to the unpopular rule and policies of the Marxist FRELIMO government following independence. After assuming power in 1975, FRELIMO alienated many Mozambicans by forcing them to live in communal villages and so-called re-education camps, suppressing tribal customs and the authority of tribal chiefs, banning political opposition, and prohibiting religious worship. Still others were alienated by FRELIMO's often mismanaged economic and agrarian policies that included collectivization of small farms and outright seizure of private land and businesses.

RENAMO, however, has always had little popular appeal beyond some segments of the peasantry because of its tainted birth as a tool of the white minority Rhodesian Government—and later of South Africa—and because its political goals were and remain underdeveloped. RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama has demanded an end to Marxism in Mozambique and the withdrawal of foreign troops, while making vague calls for multiparty elections, a Western-style economy, freedom of speech and religion, and political alignment with the West. Despite his willingness to enter into political negotiations in July 1990 with FRELIMO, Dhlakama has not articulated a specific vision for a postwar government or what role he sees for himself and RENAMO in such a government. For their part, most RENAMO commanders and troops appear less motivated by their political aims than by specific personal grievances against the government and by the opportunity to enrich themselves.

The rebels' popular appeal probably has suffered a further decline since 1988 as Maputo has begun reforms that have undercut RENAMO's anti-Marxist stance. FRELIMO has dropped Marxist-Leninist rhetoric from the party platform and scheduled a general election for 1991. FRELIMO's Central Committee approved a new constitution in November 1990 that provides for a multiparty state and direct presidential and legislative elections by secret ballot and that limits the president to three 5-year terms. Other changes include the separation of legislative and executive powers, an independent judiciary, guarantees of individual and human rights, and expanded rights to own private property. FRELIMO's reform program, along with intensive diplomatic pressure since July 1989—especially by the Mozambican

~~Top Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~

RENAMO's Origins and History

RENAMO was formed in 1976 by Rhodesian intelligence officers and was a product of the political disarray and diversity of postindependence Mozambique. Many of the disparate groups that formed RENAMO had little in common beyond their opposition to the Marxist FRELIMO government. RENAMO's Rhodesian patrons saw the group primarily as a vehicle for gathering intelligence on Robert Mugabe's Mozambican-based Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army and a tool to harass FRELIMO. To accomplish these aims, Rhodesian intelligence officials kept the group small—it never exceeded 2,000 under Rhodesian sponsorship. Authorities in Salisbury established rear bases for the insurgents in Rhodesia and provided them with arms and logistic support after Mozambican President Samora Machel imposed economic sanctions against Rhodesia. RENAMO launched its first attacks into Mozambique in early 1977. []

RENAMO suffered some setbacks under Rhodesian sponsorship. Mozambican Armed Forces, for example, overran RENAMO's main camp in the Gorongosa region of Mozambique in October 1979, killing the insurgents' first military leader, Andre Matsangaissa. A nine-month leadership struggle ensued and ended only when Afonso Dhlakama gained power after a shootout between rival factions at a Rhodesian base camp. []

Responsibility for support of the insurgency passed from Rhodesia to South Africa just before Zimbabwean independence in 1980. Pretoria viewed sponsorship of the group as a counter to Mozambican

support for the African National Congress (ANC). Open-source reporting from the period indicates that South Africa transferred RENAMO's rear bases to northern Transvaal Province, assumed responsibility for training and equipping the insurgents, established radio links between RENAMO units, and helped move insurgents in and out of Mozambique. Under South African sponsorship, RENAMO became a larger, better organized, and more effective military force that expanded its area of operations. By 1983, RENAMO was operating in nine of Mozambique's 10 provinces and disrupting economic activity throughout the country. []

Maputo's inability to contain the insurgency was a key factor in Machel's decision to conclude the Nkomati accord with South Africa in March 1984. The pact called for South Africa to end its logistic and training support for RENAMO, while Mozambique promised to terminate its military assistance to the ANC. Nevertheless, the insurgents were increasingly able to capture arms during successful attacks on vulnerable Mozambican military targets. In addition, [] Pretoria provided the insurgents with large quantities of weapons and equipment shortly before the agreement was formally concluded and that South Africa continued to assist RENAMO at a reduced scale in the post-Nkomati period. []

Catholic Church, the United States, and West European and African governments—for a peaceful settlement to the war probably were the key in pushing RENAMO to the negotiating table. []

Ethnic Base of Support

While RENAMO almost certainly contains members from all of the country's 10 major ethnic groups, the Shona-speaking Ndaou, the Sena, and the culturally

related people of the Zambezi River valley dominate its ranks. []

[] key military and political leaders, including Dhlakama, and many RENAMO recruits belong to the central Mozambican ethnic groups, which constitute approximately 15 to 20 percent of the country's

~~Top Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~

population. Historically, these people have opposed southern ethnic groups as well as the urban-based—and often more educated—Mozambican elite that has dominated the FRELIMO government. []

[] RENAMO has had some success at exploiting the gap between the backward peasantry and FRELIMO, which it portrays as embodying the nontraditional, overbearing characteristics of the former Portuguese colonial government. []

Although RENAMO's domination by rural-based Shona-speaking groups provides the rebels with a degree of cohesion, it has hindered the insurgents' ability to gain support from other ethnic groups outside the central provinces of Mozambique. []

[] RENAMO lacks significant support among the

~~Top Secret~~

4

~~Top Secret~~

Tsonga ethnic group—and the important Shangaan subgrouping—in the south and among the Maconde and Yao in the far north. Anti-RENAMO sentiment is reinforced by the rebels' frequent looting and other abuses of civilians in these regions. []

Mobilizing Popular Backing

While RENAMO's leadership has sought to improve its image and broaden its base of support, its efforts remain rudimentary and ineffective. []

[] Recent political reforms by the government, however, probably are undercutting RENAMO's efforts, especially among those opposed to past socialist policies. RENAMO has sought to downplay these reforms, calling them nothing more than FRELIMO window dressing, according to press reports. In an attempt to reach the people, RENAMO operates a mobile, clandestine radio transmitter that broadcasts antigovernment and anti-Zimbabwean propaganda. []

The sporadic broadcast schedule and the limited number of radios in rural Mozambique, however, appear to have curtailed the effectiveness of the insurgents' message. Moreover, []

[] RENAMO continues to rely on fear and intimidation to extract supplies and ensure loyalty from much of the population under its control. []

Troubled Political Leadership

Factionalism, corruption, poor leadership, and a past emphasis on the military rather than the political aspects of the struggle have left RENAMO's political organization weak and divided. []

The External Wing

RENAMO's external political wing—a small body of exiles primarily engaged in fundraising and lobbying—is largely ineffectual, in our view. These representatives—mainly mixed-race Mozambicans or

RENAMO's Abysmal Human Rights Record

While both Mozambican Government forces and RENAMO have committed serious human rights violations, RENAMO's abuse of civilians appears to be an integral part of its war strategy. In addition to attacking government installations and economic facilities, RENAMO frequently raids towns, villages, and refugee centers in search of clothing, food, weapons, recruits, and information. The villages are usually laid waste, with most crops and livestock destroyed or stolen and young men press-ganged into RENAMO service. RENAMO has also targeted government schools and health clinics. This systematic violence is among the principal causes of the flight of several million Mozambican civilians to safer urban areas or to neighboring countries. []

During these attacks, the insurgents typically kill, brutalize, and disfigure civilians. []

The insurgents place a high priority on the visual impact of the violence—usually employing axes, knives, and machetes rather than firearms—and often display bodies and body parts. While some of the violence is targeted against select FRELIMO officials and suspected informers, much of it is simply random—intended to subjugate the local population and maintain RENAMO control over an area. []

white Portuguese—maintain offices in Lisbon, Paris, Bonn, and Washington. []

open-source reporting shows that the external wing evolved in the late 1970s from a mixture of often self-appointed RENAMO publicists who sought to counterbalance FRELIMO propaganda. These representatives, however, are often inarticulate in presenting the group's positions and have proved ineffective at countering recent FRELIMO political and economic reforms. [] Dhlakama believes RENAMO's tarnished international image stems largely from the failure of the external wing to effectively promote the insurgency's cause. []

~~Top Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~

Peace Negotiations: The RENAMO Delegation

Talks between the Mozambican Government officials and RENAMO's three-man delegation aimed at achieving a peaceful resolution to the 14-year-old civil war have been under way off-and-on in Rome since mid-July 1990. []

[] Maputo and RENAMO have made substantial progress toward establishing an effective dialogue, but that both sides continue to question the other's sincerity. Nevertheless, Maputo and RENAMO were able to agree on a limited cease-fire accord in December 1990, which calls for the Zimbabwean Army to end all offensive operations in Mozambique and pull back to the Beira and Limpopo transportation corridors. A Joint Verification Commission (JVC), headquartered in Maputo, is charged with monitoring the accord. Chaired by the Italian Ambassador to Mozambique, the JVC comprises representatives from the Mozambican Government, RENAMO, Zimbabwe, the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom, France, Portugal, Congo, Kenya, and Zambia. []


Major obstacles to a peace settlement remain. RENAMO appears to be having difficulty making the transition from military to political issues and has become increasingly insecure about the talks. [] Meanwhile, the government continues its fast pace of political reform, despite the rebels' objections that they are being left out of the process. Although the government probably is willing to accept some RENAMO involvement, it seems increasingly reluctant to make significant concessions to ensure the insurgents' participation. Moreover, repeated violations of the limited cease-fire by both sides are likely to cloud prospects for future peace talks. []

Historically, Dhlakama and the rest of RENAMO's black leadership have mistrusted the group's external representatives, seeing them as out of touch, corrupt, and given to self-promotion. []

~~Top Secret~~

2363

~~Top Secret~~



Poor radio communication links between RENAMO's overseas representatives and guerrilla headquarters in central Mozambique also have hindered relations,

Dhlakama has tried—with marginal success—since mid-1989 to strengthen his control over the external wing and improve RENAMO's international image. The internal and external wings held their first

~~Top Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~

national meeting at the insurgent headquarters in central Mozambique in mid-1989 to review, modify, and strengthen RENAMO's political organization. In key personnel shifts at the meeting, Dhlakama appointed Raul Domingos—his principal aide since the early 1980s—to the highly visible post of foreign secretary and replaced RENAMO's longtime [] representative to the United States, Luis Serapiao, with Julio Sefu, according to [] press reporting. In December 1989, Dhlakama sent Joao Almirante, chief of the RENAMO cabinet and a confidant, to Portugal to assist RENAMO's [] Lisbon representative Manuel Frank. [] Despite these changes, RENAMO's external wing remains weak and largely ineffective, in our view. []

The Internal Wing

Inside Mozambique, the insurgents' nascent political structure remains the poor stepchild to the military wing of RENAMO, despite Dhlakama's attempts to make it a more effective tool of the insurgency. [] the internal political wing is led by a 10-member National Council, representing all of Mozambique's provinces, with Dhlakama as its president. A four-man presidential cabinet provides Dhlakama with counsel and administrative support, while department heads—who have responsibility for foreign affairs, information, agriculture, and other functional activities—advise Dhlakama and execute political decisions. [] the internal wing works effectively with RENAMO's military arm, almost certainly because Dhlakama, who holds the defense portfolio, ensures coordination. Nevertheless, the political leadership lacks even the most basic resources and experience necessary to build a grassroots organization, and it has yet to establish "liberated zones" inside the country. Instead, RENAMO has tried to garner popular support by turning over the administration of areas under its military control to local tribal chiefs, []

Effective Military Force

Over the past 14 years, RENAMO has developed into a nearly self-sustaining military force that has managed to keep largely inept and poorly supplied

The Shattered Mozambican Economy


Despite strong economic growth in recent years, Mozambique's economy remains badly crippled by the war. RENAMO attacks affect all sectors of the economy, not only by damaging productive facilities but also by forcing the government to use costly and inefficient armed convoys to move export crops, food, and consumer goods throughout much of the country. Agriculture has traditionally provided employment for 80 to 90 percent of Mozambique's labor forces, but the war has forced many farmers off their land and has made them refugees dependent on food aid for survival. Mozambique's principal foreign exchange earner used to be the transshipment of goods between its three ports and its landlocked neighbors, but this activity has been severely curtailed by frequent RENAMO attacks; Mozambican ports are operating at only 20 percent of capacity, according to the government. The insurgent threat has scared away badly needed foreign investment, including a large-scale plan to rehabilitate Mozambique's Cahora Bassa hydroelectric project. Finally, the counterinsurgency effort has boosted defense spending to more than 40 percent of total budget outlays, thus diverting funds from social and capital investment projects. []

government forces off-balance. From a cadre of several hundred at its formation in the mid-1970s, RENAMO grew rapidly to about 7,000 by 1982, 12,000 by 1985, and 20,000 at its peak in 1987. Combat losses, desertions, and recruitment difficulties have since kept RENAMO's military force between 15,000 and 20,000 and reduced its effectiveness. [] while some Mozambicans join voluntarily out of hopelessness or in search of food and shelter, RENAMO relies heavily on abduction and forced recruitment of the local population—especially children—to maintain its ranks. [] the typical RENAMO recruit is between 8 and 18 years old. []

~~Top Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~

Figure 3
Current Military Situation, March 1991



721294 UNCS2531 3 91

~~Top Secret~~**Centralized Chain of Command**

Dhlakama's Key Role. Dhlakama—RENAMO's leader since 1979—is a skilled tactician, highly respected by his troops, and RENAMO's top strategic planner. From the insurgents' headquarters in the Gorongosa mountain region of central Mozambique, Dhlakama coordinates daily insurgent activity and plans all major operations.

While Dhlakama exerts strong centralized control, the country's large size and inevitable communications difficulties permit some local commanders a considerable degree of autonomy, including the ability to initiate small-scale operations.

Organization. RENAMO's military structure—particularly at the higher levels—is fairly well organized, in our view.

the insurgent organization is broken down into provincial, sectoral, and group or platoon commands. each province typically has a fixed RENAMO base in a remote location that houses a provincial commander who directs province-wide operations. Each province is subdivided into a number of sectoral commands. Below this level, units appear more loosely organized, with the smallest organizational unit being the operational group or

platoon, which is usually about 30 men. RENAMO typically establishes camps in semiwooded areas near food and water sources and frequently rotates camp locations to avoid detection.

In addition to this formalized structure, RENAMO maintains a number of battalions directly subordinate to the General Staff, and numerous specialized units, probably under Dhlakama's direct control. For example, each province has well-trained, commando-type forces that augment regular units during important attacks on towns and Mozambican Army outposts. These units usually contain specialists in tribal dialects and Portuguese for interrogation of captured soldiers, in addition to radio operators for communicating with the provincial base.

Morale and Discipline Problems. Over the past year, RENAMO has been beset by a series of problems that are eroding its military effectiveness but do not appear to seriously threaten its continued survival.

senior commanders are well motivated. low morale at lower ranks due to food, weapons, and ammunition shortages, inadequate clothing, and pervasive disease.

the insurgents' small number of crude field hospitals suffer frequent shortages of medical supplies and trained personnel, thereby further undermining morale.

While most observers describe RENAMO as a disciplined fighting force, shortages and general war weariness are fueling desertions, insubordination, corruption, and drug use that have reduced RENAMO's military effectiveness in recent years.

widespread use of marijuana and

~~Top Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~

methaqualone by RENAMO troops before staging attacks.

Capabilities

Although RENAMO possesses only limited capabilities, it has consistently demonstrated its ability to maintain strong military pressure on the hapless government forces since the mid-1980s.

Communications and Weaponry.

RENAMO personnel have a uniform set of guidelines for reporting to the high command; local commanders are required to submit daily situation reports, and regional commanders are responsible for producing monthly reports detailing successes, losses, and logistic information.

Junior officers often lack radios and communicate with one another via written messages carried by couriers who sometimes use motorcycles captured from government forces.

RENAMO troops are armed with a hodgepodge of weapons, most of which have been captured from Mozambican Army outposts. Although many units suffer from periodic shortages of weaponry and ammunition, those that have firearms are typically armed with AK-47s and a variety of other Soviet-model and Western-made assault rifles and sub-machineguns. RENAMO's arsenal also includes B-10/B-11 recoilless antitank guns, 82-mm and 60-mm mortars, RPG-2 and RPG-7 grenade launchers, bazookas, antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, and some anti-aircraft guns. A lack of wheeled transport capability usually limits RENAMO's use of

~~Top Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~

heavier weapons, forcing the insurgents to use only what they can carry. [redacted] in late 1988 RENAMO captured nine SA-7 surface-to-air missiles. While the SA-7s could dramatically improve RENAMO's anti-aircraft capabilities, there is no evidence that RENAMO has successfully used them—probably due to the lack of instruction. [redacted]

The insurgents have also obtained weapons from corrupt Mozambican Government personnel as well as from foreign suppliers. [redacted]

Intelligence Collection. RENAMO appears to have developed a fairly good intelligence network that focuses on information that would help its military planning. [redacted] the insurgents rely on informants in the Mozambican Army and from local villages to obtain advance warning of government operations. [redacted] frequently poorly trained and equipped government troops are easily "bought off" by RENAMO. [redacted]

is less effective, however, at collecting intelligence on the better trained and disciplined Zimbabwean forces and typically has less warning of Zimbabwean ground and air operations. [redacted]

Tactics

RENAMO typically operates in small units, only infrequently forming larger groups—sometimes up to several hundred—when launching major attacks against government-defended towns. [redacted] The insurgents primarily engage in hit-and-run raids on small government outposts, transportation arteries, and other poorly defended economic targets. RENAMO units largely avoid engaging the well-trained and effective Zimbabwean

Zimbabwean Military Involvement in Mozambique

Zimbabwean forces were first deployed to Mozambique in late 1982 to protect the Beira transportation corridor—running from the port city of Beira to Mutare in eastern Zimbabwe—against attacks by RENAMO insurgents and South African commandos. In early 1984, Harare assigned a motorized battalion to provide protection for truck convoys traveling along the Tete road linking Zimbabwe and Malawi. Until mid-1985, Zimbabwean forces in Mozambique—which never exceeded 3,500—limited their activity to providing security along these two transportation routes. Moreover, the Zimbabwean Army apparently had reached a modus vivendi with RENAMO that kept interruptions on the two routes down to a low level. [redacted]

Concern over Mozambique's deteriorating security situation and appeals from then Mozambican President Machel for increased military assistance pushed Zimbabwean leaders in mid-1985 to increase the size and scope of their military commitment. By mid-1985 Harare had nearly 10,000 troops in central Mozambique undertaking offensive operations against RENAMO forces. In late 1988, several thousand Zimbabwean troops started protecting the northern part of the Limpopo rail line, which runs from Chicualacuala on the Zimbabwean border to the port of Maputo. For the past few years, Harare has maintained up to 7,000 troops in Mozambique to protect the Beira, Limpopo, and Tete transportation corridors and to undertake joint and unilateral counterinsurgency operations against RENAMO in the central part of the country. [redacted]

forces, but when the two sides have clashed the insurgents have usually fared poorly. The Beira corridor—the road, rail, and oil pipeline network connecting the Mozambican port city of Beira to Mutare—is a priority target for the insurgents. The Limpopo railway, connecting Maputo with southeastern Zimbabwe, is also frequently attacked, as is vehicle traffic

~~Top Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~

along the Tete corridor—the road running from Zimbabwe through Tete Province to Malawi—and other economic targets, such as large agricultural estates, cooperatives, and development projects. RENAMO activity is usually heaviest during the October through May rainy season, when fresh tall grass and dense foliage provide cover, and abundant rains slow government counterinsurgency operations. []

Cross-Border Raids. RENAMO regularly carries the war across Mozambique's borders. Specialized insurgent units conduct frequent cross-border raids into eastern Zimbabwe, killing civilians and looting villages in retaliation for Zimbabwe's military support for Maputo. RENAMO also periodically penetrates up to 25 kilometers into Zambian territory in search of food and supplies. []

[] Most recently, RENAMO increased the intensity of its raids into Zambia—including ambushes of commercial convoys—in apparent retaliation for a Zambian Army crackdown on previous RENAMO cross-border incursions. []

Urban Sabotage. Although RENAMO does not have a capability for sustained urban sabotage, the insurgents occasionally carry out isolated attacks in larger cities to disrupt industry, harass transportation arteries, and embarrass the government. These attacks appear to occur in cycles, often in retaliation for government offensives in the countryside. Maputo and its suburbs are the prime targets, with the insurgents attacking key roads and rail lines. []

[] attacks on Maputo's electric powerlines have resulted in prolonged power outages in large sections of the city. []

Waning External Assistance

Although RENAMO has evolved into a largely self-sustaining insurgency, limited external aid appears to have been critical in bridging past supply shortages, especially of ammunition. Even this limited external assistance, however, has sharply declined since late 1989. This reduction probably has lessened RENAMO's overall military effectiveness. Longtime RENAMO supporters, such as South Africa, have

made substantial cutbacks, forcing the insurgents to look to other friendly governments, such as Kenya, and private groups for limited, albeit important, sources of aid. []

Changing South African Ties

We believe, [] that South Africa's supplies of arms and logistic assistance have significantly decreased over the past year.¹ A RENAMO official said last year that Pretoria has not provided any materiel to the insurgents since November 1989, and RENAMO's reportedly severe ammunition shortages in 1990 tend to confirm that insurgent supplies are dwindling. The apparent reduction of official assistance is almost certainly the result of Pretoria's attempts to steadily improve relations with Mozambique and the other Frontline States, as well as South African President de Klerk's desire to deemphasize Pretoria's previous regional policy of military destabilization. []

In our view, South Africa's once considerable influence over RENAMO has diminished as its official assistance wanes and strains in the relationship emerge. Tension between RENAMO and Pretoria became evident in late 1989, when, [] a senior South African official pressed RENAMO to enter into peace talks with FRELIMO/ []

RENAMO could no longer depend on official support from Pretoria. The decline in mutual trust []

Meanwhile, []

¹ Over the past decade, South Africa appears to have provided RENAMO with medical supplies, communications equipment, clothing, small arms and ammunition, and financial assistance. []

[] material was either airdropped into Mozambique at prearranged sites, delivered by aircraft to remote airstrips, or trucked across the border from neighboring states. []

[] South African ships and submarines delivered supplies along Mozambique's extensive coastline. []

~~Top Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~

Figure 5. Rail line sabotaged by RENAMO

[] Dhlakama moved his family from South Africa to Mozambique in early November 1989. []

RENAMO continues to receive some assistance from private South African sources, in our view. [] we suspect that some of the 60,000 to 70,000 Portuguese-speaking South Africans who suffered financial and other losses when they fled newly independent Mozambique in 1975 have long been aiding RENAMO. At present, their aid probably consists of limited financial support and small amounts of clothing, medicine, and other nonlethal supplies funneled through RENAMO representatives abroad or through supply networks in Malawi. Pretoria almost certainly is aware of this assistance, but has yet to crack down on this activity by its Portuguese-speaking community []

Despite recent strains in the relationship between Pretoria and RENAMO, some current and former South African military personnel have maintained contact with the insurgents. []

~~Top Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~

headquarters to an area near the Malawian border. [] This move, which followed a joint Zimbabwean and government offensive against RENAMO's Gorongosa headquarters, will also make it more difficult for Mozambican and Zimbabwean ground and air units—deployed primarily in central Mozambique and eastern Zimbabwe—to attack the new base. []

In exchange for Malawi's support, the insurgents agreed in August 1989 to end their attacks on the Nacala railway, which connects landlocked Malawi to the Mozambican port of Nacala. The railway is Malawi's primary transportation link to the sea and is protected by a 1,000-man Malawian Army contingent. []

[] Malawian officials sealed the deal with RENAMO by offering assistance—probably medical and other non-lethal supplies. []

Kenyan Aid. RENAMO also receives limited support from the pro-Western and conservative Kenyan regime largely because of Nairobi's hostility toward the leftist FRELIMO government. As one of the original mediators in the peace process, Kenya has had frequent public and private contact with senior RENAMO officials, including Dhlakama, and has acted on the insurgents' behalf—perhaps in part because of Nairobi's cool relations with Maputo. Over the past year, Kenya has provided RENAMO with an unknown quantity of clothes, medicine, and food, []

Regional and Private Support

Malawian Assistance. Despite Malawi's denials, [] RENAMO and Malawian officials maintain [] contact and that the insurgents use Malawi for transit and sanctuary, as well as a source of supplies. In return for this assistance, RENAMO has largely refrained from attacking vital Malawian transportation routes that pass through Mozambique. Although RENAMO has no permanent camps in Malawi, the insurgents are able to move freely across the border []

[] in late 1989 shipments of military equipment from unidentified suppliers in South Africa were flown into an airstrip controlled by Malawian police and then trucked into RENAMO-controlled zones of Mozambique. []

[] RENAMO has also purchased arms and ammunition from individual Malawian Army soldiers trading on the black market. []

The relationship between RENAMO and Malawi reportedly extends to Dhlakama and President Banda. [] Banda has full knowledge of Malawian contacts with RENAMO. [] Banda himself met with Dhlakama in August 1989 when the latter traveled through Malawi on his way to Nairobi. In addition, []

RENAMO's access to Malawian territory became easier in April 1990 when the insurgents transferred the political and administrative portions of their []

~~Top Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~

Rumored Arab Assistance. Rumors of aid to RENAMO from conservative Arab states—such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Kuwait—have circulated since the late 1970s. Arab aid to RENAMO is allegedly intended to defend Mozambique's Muslim community of some 840,000, many of whom were the victims of FRELIMO's antireligious fervor immediately following independence.

Private Support. We believe RENAMO receives covert financial and some material support from a number of private sources worldwide.

Outlook

Peace talks with Maputo pose a new set of challenges for RENAMO leaders who—unlike their FRELIMO counterparts who negotiated independence from Portugal—have little experience in striking political deals. RENAMO's vague goals and lack of vision for governing the country are likely to slow progress toward a comprehensive settlement. Although insurgent leaders have spelled out some demands for a peace agreement, many of these conditions—such as a multiparty political system, free elections, and moves toward a free market economy—have already been announced by Maputo. As FRELIMO moves forward on its political initiatives, RENAMO probably will find it increasingly difficult to broaden its popular

support, a condition likely to limit RENAMO's ability to negotiate a satisfactory political role for itself in a new government.

We believe that RENAMO's political leadership supports Dhlakama's efforts to reach a peace settlement, but the inexperience and divisions within the political organization are likely to limit the insurgents' ability to forge a consensus on negotiating positions. A peaceful resolution of the conflict is probably a lower priority for RENAMO's farflung external representatives than for internal rebel leaders, who have to cope with the ravages of the war. RENAMO's internal political wing, for its part, is unlikely to permit the distrusted overseas representatives an active role in the peace process, further circumscribing RENAMO's pool of negotiators. Although peace talks are likely to provide RENAMO with increased publicity, its squabbling and ineffective external representatives will almost certainly keep the organization from gaining wider international support.

We believe Dhlakama will continue to pursue the war vigorously whether negotiations continue or break down, even though he and other insurgent leaders almost certainly realize that they cannot defeat Maputo militarily. Dhlakama is likely to periodically intensify operations, especially around the capital and against economic targets, in an attempt to strengthen his hand in negotiations. In the unlikely event that the insurgents' military position deteriorated significantly, Dhlakama might seek a cease-fire to buy time, to recoup losses, and garner favorable publicity.

In our view, Dhlakama will continue to enjoy the loyalty and respect of his military commanders, but remains at some personal risk due to the war and his travels to negotiations outside Mozambique. In the event Dhlakama were killed in combat or assassinated, we believe RENAMO's military effectiveness would be temporarily disrupted as insurgent leaders jockeyed for position. Although the death of Dhlakama probably would not cause RENAMO to disintegrate, it would almost certainly slow progress toward a settlement as the new insurgent leadership attempted to consolidate its power.

~~Top Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~

Although RENAMO is a largely self-sustaining force, waning external support is likely to intensify ammunition and supply shortages. South Africa probably will allow limited support to reach the insurgents in order to retain some measure of influence, but Pretoria is unlikely to resume large-scale official assistance in the near term, and the insurgents will probably increasingly look to other sources, such as Malawi, Kenya, conservative Arab countries, and private supporters, for support. []

Implications for the Region and the United States

Although an unlikely prospect in the short term, a peaceful resolution to Mozambique's 14-year-old civil war would have a significant and positive impact on regional stability. An end to the war would not only permit economic recovery in Mozambique but also vastly improve prospects for regional economic development through the rehabilitation of key southern African transportation routes. Mozambique's three major railways have the potential to earn foreign exchange for Maputo from shipments by neighbors through Mozambican ports and facilitate economic growth in Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana. Peace also would alleviate the widespread suffering and famine in Mozambique by permitting increased humanitarian assistance and allowing the return of more than 1 million refugees from neighboring countries. []

As the preeminent regional power and a country with extensive historic and economic ties to Mozambique, South Africa is well positioned to take advantage of

any postwar reconstruction effort. Maputo relies heavily on foreign exchange earnings from South African trade shipments through Mozambique and on remittances from Mozambicans working in South Africa. Moreover, Maputo apparently believes that maintaining a close economic relationship with South Africa is critical to its future and probably will look to Pretoria for economic and technical assistance, as well as a source of foreign investment. []

The possibility of a political settlement in Mozambique also holds new opportunities and challenges for the United States. As in the case of the key US role in the Angolan-Namibian-South African settlement, US diplomatic efforts to encourage both RENAMO and FRELIMO to end the war will almost certainly help Washington to improve relations with Mozambique and generally further improve its standing in the region. Peace would create opportunities for US private investment in areas such as the rehabilitation of farming, railroads, ports, industry, and oil refining. Although the \$100 million in US aid last year—including emergency food donations—to Mozambique is currently the largest US aid program in Sub-Saharan Africa, Maputo undoubtedly would look to Washington to play a leading role in recovery efforts by seeking additional financial assistance. []

~~Top Secret~~